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needed to address the problem of corporate violations of human rights.
An effective solution requires international agreement not only on the
human rights obligations of corporations, but also on an effective enforcement mechanism. The international community should view the
recent ATCA cases against corporations as a call to collective action.
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE: WHEN
DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS JOIN THE
CONVERSATION

The past few decades have witnessed a tremendous increase in the
number of domestic tribunals that look to international and foreign legal sources to inform their interpretations of domestic law.1 Domestic
courts, when ruling on a particular substantive legal issue, can look for
guidance not only to bilateral and multinational treaties that relate to
the issue,2 but also to decisions of supranational tribunals3 that have
addressed similar legal questions. Conversely, supranational and foreign tribunals faced
with analogous legal issues can refer to domestic
4
courts' decisions.
Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6 of the Canadian Supreme Court
has described the current practice of citing, analyzing, relying on, or
distinguishing the decisions of foreign and supranational tribunals as a
"dialogue." s This Part builds on the terminology of Justice L'Heureux-

1 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1104-I 5 (2000)
(discussing the increasing interaction between domestic and supranational courts).
2 See Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. I5, 24 (1998).
3 This Part uses the terms "supranational tribunals" and "supranational courts" to refer to
courts that do not belong to any particular nation. Recent literature has discussed the relationship between several supranational courts and domestic courts. See COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 40-42 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., i996) (discussing domestic compliance with the rulings of the International Court of Justice); Slaughter, supra
note i, at 1104-12 (discussing the increasing influence of the European Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights); see also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE
DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 284-94 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing capital punish-

ment rulings of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).
4 See Slaughter, supra note i, at xo5 (examining the "cooperative relationship" between the
European Court of Justice and domestic tribunals in Europe); sources cited supra note 3.
5 L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2, at 17. Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 argues that "until recently"
the process was one of "reception": new constitutional courts often applied the reasoning of older
tribunals, particularly British and American courts. Id. at 17-18. Citing cases decided during the
199os in a broad range of jurisdictions (Australia, Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe),
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 claims that "[c]urrent trends" demonstrate that courts now engage in
"dialogue": judges look to a "broad spectrum of sources" and "mutually read[] and discuss[] each
others' jurisprudence." Id. at 21. This Part uses the term "dialogue" in a similar fashion to describe the mutual exchange of ideas through published opinions. For a discussion of the role of
civil law countries' courts in this dialogue, see note 66, below.
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Dub6 and refers to this phenomenon as the "international judicial dialogue" or the "international judicial conversation."
6
The developments in international criminal law described above,
such as the increasing importance of international criminal tribunals,
are likely to lead to a more sophisticated judicial conversation in the
realm of criminal law.' Supranational criminal tribunals may look to
domestic law in order to determine proper procedures and appropriate
punishments;" the decisions of these tribunals may in turn influence
the development of domestic criminal law. 9
A major area of criminal law that has been influenced by the international judicial dialogue is the law of capital punishment.' 0 Domestic
courts, particularly those that consider constitutional questions, often
face issues involving the death penalty. This Part examines the recent
historical development of the dialogue among constitutional courts"
and supranational courts by studying various capital punishment
cases.' 2 It analyzes these death penalty decisions in order to address a

6 See supra Parts II-III.
7 Courts engage in the international judicial dialogue in both criminal and civil contexts. See
L'Heureux-Dubd, supra note 2, at 21-22 (noting courts' reliance on outside jurisprudence to
determine criminal issues that involve the death penalty or to analyze procedural matters such as
the right to counsel); Slaughter, supra note i, at 112-15 (discussing how the globalization of the
economy has forced courts to consider foreign law in rulings that involve domestic corporate law).
The trends described in this Development indicate that the international judicial dialogue in the
criminal context will become particularly important in the next few years. As international criminal tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), increase in number and importance, see
supra Part II, p. i98o, the decisions of these courts may foster the development of a more sophisticated international judicial conversation on criminal law.
8 See, e.g., supra Part III, pp. 1998-99.
9 Cf United States v. Burns, 2001 SCC 7, 88 (Can.), http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/cscscc/en/rec/htmllburnsi.en.htrnl (last visited Apr. 8, 2001) (noting that the trend toward abolition
of the death penalty led the ICTY and the ICTR to exclude the death penalty from the available
punishment options).
10 The worldwide trend toward abolition of the death penalty is intertwined with the international judicial dialogue of constitutional courts. In some nations, courts have declared the death
penalty unconstitutional. See, e.g., State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3)SALR 391, 451 (CC) (S. Afr.)
(holding that the death penalty violates the constitutional prohibition against "inhuman and degrading" punishment). Courts in nations that have eliminated the death penalty must also confront constitutional issues raised by the existence of capital punishment elsewhere, such as the
legality of extraditing a fugitive to a nation where he might face a sentence of death. See, e.g.,
Kindler v. Canada, [19911 2 S.C.R. 779, 856 (Can.) (holding that the extradition of two fugitives to
the United States would not violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). For an informative discussion of the international trend toward abolition, see SCHABAS, supra note 3.
11 This Part uses the term "constitutional court" to refer to any court that engages in constitutional interpretation, even if that court also engages in other types of legal interpretation.
12 The constitutional context is an appropriate area of focus because the development of the
international judicial dialogue parallels the rise in "world constitutionalism." Professor Bruce Ackerman has used the term "world constitutionalism" to describe both the increase in the number
of written constitutions since World War II and the increase in the importance of national consti-
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larger issue that seems to arise only when constitutional courts engage
in the international judicial dialogue: whether domestic constitutional
texts must "license" courts' examination of foreign or supranational jurisprudence.1 3 This Part assesses why many constitutional courts do
not attempt to justify their participation in the international conversation in terms of a constitutional license.
Section A scrutinizes the interpretive approach taken by several
courts that have engaged in the international judicial dialogue in the
capital punishment context. This section contends that the courts'
willingness to analyze and then either to follow or disregard foreign
and supranational precedents suggests that they do not view domestic
law as subordinate to international law. Section A concludes that the
supposed superiority of international law does not license engagement
in the international judicial conversation. Section B examines various
reasons that courts might look to outside jurisprudence and argues
that none adequately explains why they do not justify their reliance on
foreign and supranational precedents in terms of a textual constitutional license. Section B concludes that the courts of other nations the constitutional traditions of which were formed largely by borrowing from foreign sources - seem to view their domestic charters as
having an international character. Section C then analyzes the oftnoted hesitancy of the U.S. Supreme Court to engage in dialogue with
its foreign counterparts 14 and argues that one explanation for the

tutional courts that interpret these documents. Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 771-72 (1997).
13 See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, xo8 YALE L.J.
1225, 1231 (1999) (using the word "license" in the context of comparative constitutional law); infra
pp. 2062-63.
14 Much of the academic scholarship in this area has focused on the wisdom of entering the
international conversation. See Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the "Rise of World Constitutionalism",2000 WIS. L. REV. 597, 615; Tushnet, supra note
13, at 1226-27 (noting the current tendency among scholars and judges to encourage American
courts to learn from the jurisprudence of foreign jurisdictions); James H. Wyman, Vengeance Is
Whose?: The Death Penalty and Cultural Relativism in InternationalLaw, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L.
& POL'Y 543, 553-57 (I997); see also Margaret A. Burnham, Cultivating a Seedling Charter:
South Africa's Court Grows Its Constitution, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 29, 45 (1997) (criticizing the
failure of the U.S. Supreme Court to follow a "global jurisprudence" similar to that of the South
African Constitutional Court); Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'y 807, 81s-i8 (2000) (noting the current debate between Justices Scalia and
Breyer over the propriety of using international and foreign legal materials in constitutional interpretation); cf. Carol S. Steiker, Pretoria,Not Peoria:S v. Makwanyane and Another, r995 (3) SA
39z, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1285, 1288 (1996) (arguing that the United States should follow the lead of
the South African Constitutional Court by becoming more willing to introduce reforms through
the judicial process). But see Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons:Some CautionaryRemarks
on the Process of ConstitutionalBorrowing, i U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640 (1999) (advocating a cautious approach to the use of comparative law); Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1308 (recommending
that U.S. courts exercise care when using nondomestic jurisprudence).
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Court's behavior is its view of the U.S. Constitution as a document
with a singularly American character.
This Part proposes that the decision to look to international law
when making or interpreting a domestic constitution reflects in part a
concept of the constitution as one - but still only one - of many
documents embodying the norms of international law. Courts with an
internationalist view of their domestic charters do not need an explicit
textual license to find that outside precedents, though not always dispositive, are nevertheless pertinent to constitutional interpretation.
A. The Process of Incorporation
The death penalty cases discussed in this section demonstrate that
constitutional courts employ a common interpretive process when they
engage in the international judicial dialogue. Although these courts
canvass relevant foreign and supranational jurisprudence, they also
study applicable domestic law and political concerns to evaluate
whether the incorporation of outside legal norms will be compatible
with the domestic climate. The willingness of these courts to examine
and then either to follow or distinguish foreign and supranational authority indicates that these tribunals do not participate in the international judicial dialogue because they believe that the opinion of the inInstead, these
ternational community supersedes domestic law.
domestic courts engage in the dialogue because they view outside jurisprudence as a helpful resource that indicates how other courts have
dealt with similar legal issues.
i. Examining Foreign and SupranationalJurisprudence. - The
ways in which two domestic constitutional courts examined the same
supranational precedent provides a useful illustration of the interpretive process used by courts that engage in the international judicial
dialogue. The Canadian and Jamaican Supreme Courts both anaof
lyzed, but treated differently, the decision of the European Court
6
Human Rights (European Court)'- in Soering v. United Kingdom.1
In Soering, the European Court examined whether the United
Kingdom's extradition of a fugitive to face a possible death sentence in
Virginia would offend article 3 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
15 The European Court of Human Rights functions independently of the institutions of the
European Union. The 1949 treaty that established the Council of Europe also created this court
to enforce the protections embodied in the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Stephen Breyer, Changing Relationships Among European
Constitutional Courts, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1045, 1056-57 (2ooo). The court has jurisdiction
over the forty nations that comprise the Council of Europe. Id. In recent years, the European
Court has become increasingly influential in the development of international human rights
norms. Slaughter, supra note i, at 1109-12.
16 App. No. 14038/88, 1i Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989) (Eur. Ct. H.R.).

2001]

DEVELOPMENTS -

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

2053

Convention).17 The court noted that capital defendants in Virginia often remained on death row for six to eight years because of the lengthy
appeals process. 18 The court found that by subjecting prisoners to "the
anguish and mounting tension of . .. the ever-present shadow of
death," 19 extradition of a fugitive to face this "death row phenomenon"
violated article 3.2 o
The Canadian Supreme Court looked to, but declined to follow,
Soering when deciding Kindler v. Canada,2 1 a case that similarly involved the extradition of two fugitives to the United States. 22 Like the
European Court in Soering, the Canadian court in Kindler analyzed
relevant international law and maintained that its ruling was "not out
of step with the international community."23 The Canadian court recognized that its decision to permit extradition conflicted with the
views of the European Court, but contended that the decision in Soering did not reflect a universally accepted norm. 24 Pointing to a decision by the European Commission of Human Rights (European Commission) that allowed the extradition of a fugitive to the United States,
the Canadian court argued that the international community was divided on the propriety of extraditing fugitives to face the death penalty.25 The court found that the legal norm reflected in the European
Commission's ruling would accord better with Canada's domestic

17 Id. at 464. The European Court noted that article 3 of the European Convention prohibits
"inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
18 Id. at 475.

19 Id. at 476.

20 Id. at 478. The Soering court canvassed relevant international and regional documents and
concluded that the protection in article 3 accorded with international norms on capital punishment. The court noted, for example, that article 3's prohibition of inhuman or degrading punishment mirrored similar provisions in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the r969 American Convention on Human Rights. Id. at 467. The protection in article 3 thus seemed to be "an internationally accepted standard." Id. The European
Court was careful to ensure, however, that its decision was consistent with the practices of the
member states of the European Convention. The court found a "virtual consensus," id. at 473
(internal quotation marks omitted), regarding the invalidity of the death penalty that, it suggested,
allowed it to restrict the ability of member states to extradite fugitives, see id. at 473-74. The
court noted that in the nations that retained the death penalty, such a sentence, even if imposed,
was never carried out. Id. at 473.
21 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (Can.).
22 See id. at 840. The court considered whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required the Canadian government to seek assurances from the United States that the death
penalty would not be imposed. Id. at 839-40. The court noted that article 7 of the Canadian
Charter protects "the right to life, liberty and security of the person," while article 12 prohibits
"cruel and unusual treatment or punishment." Id. at 843.
23 ld. at 856.
24 Id.
25 Id. (citing Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10479/83, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. x58 (x984)).
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needs.2 6 Thus, even though the Canadian court declined to follow an
international norm, it chose to justify its decision in terms of international law.
In contrast to the Canadian Supreme Court, the British Privy
Council, sitting as the Jamaican Supreme Court in Pratt v. AttorneyGeneral for Jamaica,2 7 gave more weight to the European Court's
analysis in Soering. Pratt involved an appeal brought by two capital
28
defendants who had been on death row for almost fourteen years.
The defendants argued that such a long detention spent awaiting
death constituted "inhuman or degrading punishment" in violation of
section 17(1) of the Jamaican constitution. 29 The Privy Council, de"shocking," 30 commuted the defendants' sentences
scribing the delay as 31
to life imprisonment.
In its opinion, the Privy Council surveyed the international scene
and noted the division of opinion among domestic and supranational
courts regarding the cruelty of long detentions, particularly when the
delay resulted from defendants' discretionary appeals. 32 Persuaded by
the reasoning in decisions like Soering,33 the Privy Council found that
if a prisoner were able to delay his execution for a period of years, the
fault would lie with the inefficient appellate process. 34 The Privy
Council examined the domestic situation in Jamaica and sympathized
with the nation's "disturbing murder rate" and "limited financial resources" with which to administer the criminal justice system. 35 The
26 The court observed that because of Canada's "long border with the United States," id. at
844, there was a serious concern that if the Canadian government were unable to extradite fugitives, the country "might become a safe haven for criminals ... seeking to avoid the death penalty," id. at 853.
27 1994] 2 A.C. I (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from Jam.).
28 Id. at 33; see also id. at 19-27 (describing the chronology of events in the case).
29 Id. at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30 Id. at 33.
31 Id. at34.
32 Id. at 30-31 (comparing decisions such as Kindler and Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473
(gth Cir. r99o), both of which held that a long detention on death row was not cruel or unusual, to
the Zimbabwean Supreme Court's decision in Catholic Commissionfor Justice and Peace v. Attorney-General, 1993 (1) ZLR 242 (S)(Zimb.), which found that prisoners could not be faulted for
taking advantage of every opportunity to appeal). The Privy Council also noted that one of the
defendants in Pratt had appealed to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
United Nations Human Rights Committee, id. at 21-22, both of which concluded that the sentence should be commuted on humanitarian grounds, id. at 23-25.
33 Id. at 31-33. The Privy Council compared Pratt to Soering as though the latter were a
clear precedent for the former and stated that the delay in Pratt's execution was "double the time
that the European Court of Human Rights considered would be an infringement of article 3 of the
European Convention... and their Lordships can have no doubt that an execution would now be
an infringement of section 1T(x) of the Jamaican Constitution." Id. at 33.
34 Id. ("It is part of the human condition that a condemned man will take every opportunity to
save his life through use of the appellate procedure.").
35 Id. at 34.
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Privy Council found, however, that Jamaica's colonial history, as well
as its own rules of criminal procedure, indicated that Jamaica could
the court considered to be the appropriate internacomply with what
36
tional standard.
2. The Increasing Sophistication of the Dialogue. - A comparison
of two other decisions, one by the Indian Supreme Court in 198o and
the other by the South African Constitutional Court in 1995, illustrates
the growing complexity and sophistication of the international dialogue. The enormous increase in the number of supranational and foreign constitutional courts, along with the increasing availability of
written opinions from a broad range of jurisdictions, allowed the
South African Constitutional Court to examine many more judicial resources than its counterpart in India.3 1 Yet although the South African Constitutional Court was able to conduct a more expansive and
detailed analysis of international law, both courts employed an interpretive approach similar to that used by the Canadian and Jamaican
Supreme Courts in the cases discussed above.
The Indian Supreme Court's decision in Bachan Singh v. Punjab,38
which upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty,39 illustrates a
case typical of those in the early years of the international judicial dialogue. In Bachan Singh, the Indian Supreme Court surveyed foreign
practice 40 and scholarship. 4 1 It relied in particular on the jurisprudence of the United States and Great Britain, the only two nations
whose law reports were widely available.4 2 Because the Indian court
found that many "persons of reason, learning and light" disagreed

36 Id. The Privy Council recalled that the death penalty had always been carried out swiftly
in Britain, id. at 17, and scolded that "[d]elay of the character which has occurred in this case had
never happened in Jamaica before independence," id. at ig.
37 Modern technology has increased the accessibility of foreign and supranational decisions.
See L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2, at 25 (noting that advances in technology, such as the Internet, have helped judges access the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions).
38 [19801 2 S.C.J. 475 (India).
39 Id. at 509.
40 Id. at 504-06, 509. The court stated that its objective in surveying international practice
was to demonstrate that "in spite of the Abolitionist movement, only 18 States ... have abolished
the death penalty for all offenses." Id. at So6. Listing Russia, the United States, France, Belgium,
Malaysia, China, and Japan as nations that retained the death penalty, the Indian court commented that those countries "cannot, by any standard, be called uncivilized nations or immature
societies." Id.
41 Id. at 497-500, 502-04. The court observed that there had been few scientific studies on
crime in India, id. at 504, demonstrating one of the practical reasons for its decision to use international and foreign sources, see infra section B.i, pp. 2059-62 (discussing practical reasons for
the incorporation of international law).
42 Bachan Singh, [19801 2 S.C.J. at 496-97, 501, 513-14, 518-2 1; see L'Heureux-Dub6, supra
note 2, at 20. The Indian court's reliance on American law may also be a result of the textual
similarities between the American and Indian constitutions. See id. at 18.
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it refused to substitute its opinabout the utility of the death penalty,
43
parliament.
the
of
will
ion for the
Even as it discussed international practice and precedent, the Indian Supreme Court maintained that its analysis of international law
was consistent with domestic history and tradition. 4 4 The court highlighted several portions of the Indian constitution that indicated that
45
the "Constitution-makers" favored retention of the death penalty.
Perhaps most explicitly, the court - even as it relied heavily on
American jurisprudence - expressed "grave doubts about the expediency of transplanting western experience in our country."46 The
court's reference to India's cultural differences with other nations
seems to have been a way of justifying its decision not to incorporate
some outside legal standards.
Fifteen years later in State v. Makwanyane,47 the South African
Constitutional Court considered whether capital punishment constituted "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" in violation of section 11(2) of the Interim Constitution of South Africa. 48 Before holding the death penalty unconstitutional, 49 the South African
court conducted an extensive review of international and foreign legal
materials pertaining to capital punishment. The Constitutional Court
noted that a provision of the South African Interim Constitution required an analysis of international and foreign materials.50 The court
43 Bachan Singh, [1980] 2 S.C.J. at 507. The court emphasized its attitude of judicial restraint
and its usual reluctance to hold acts of parliament unconstitutional. Id. at 493, 505. See infra
note 78.
44 As it surveyed foreign practice with respect to the death penalty, the court emphasized that
"conditions ...in [its] own country" were of particular concern. Id. at 505. Citing the Encyclopedia Britannica (a reference that perhaps, in and of itself, demonstrates the limited nature of
judicial communication in 198o), the court observed that the violent crime rate was rising rapidly
throughout the world but immediately discussed crime conditions in India. See id.
45 Id. at 508. The court pointed, for example, to article 72(I)(c) of the Indian constitution,
which gives the president the power to commute a death sentence. Id.
46 Id. at 514. The court was referring to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), that the unfettered discretion given to judges and juries, which led
to the arbitrary application of the death penalty, violated the Eighth Amendment. Bachan Singh,
[19801 2 S.C.J. at 5 13-14.
47 1995 (3)SALR 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
48 Id. at 403. The Interim Constitution was adopted in 1993 after the completion of the defendants' trial but before the end of the appeals process. Id. at 401.
49 The court concluded that the death penalty was a "cruel, inhuman and degrading" punishment, id. at 434, and that the government had not made a "clear and convincing case" to justify
such an infringement of section 11(2) of the South African Interim Constitution, id. at 45 1.
50 The court quoted section 35(I) of the Interim Constitution:
In interpreting the provisions of this chapter a court of law shall promote the values
which underlie an open and democratic society... and shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in
this chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law.
Id. at 413 (internal quotation marks omitted). South Africa's current constitution contains a similar provision. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act No. io8, 1996), § 39 (stating that courts, when interpret-
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indicated, however, that even absent such a provision, it would have
looked to external legal sources because of their "value" in demonstrating how foreign courts had handled similar issues.-"
The South African Constitutional Court observed that a general
trend toward limiting the use of capital punishment had developed
"[a]s societies became more enlightened" in the second half of the twentieth century.5 2 The court then reviewed the death penalty jurisprudence of several foreign courts5 3 and supranational tribunals.5 4 Although the South African court found that the death penalty did not
violate public international law per se,5 5 it noted that the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Hungarian Constitutional
Court, and three justices of the Canadian Supreme Court5 6 had de57
clared the death sentence to be a cruel and unusual punishment.
Even courts that had upheld the death penalty, such as the Supreme
Courts of the United States and India, had placed restrictions on its
implementation. 58 Thus, the bulk of international law, viewed in the
context of the worldwide trend toward limiting or abolishing capital
punishment, supported the South African court's decision to invalidate
the death penalty.

ing the South African Bill of Rights, "(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society... ; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law").
51 Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 413; see also infra note 76 (assessing whether the South African court felt it needed a constitutional "license" to conduct an analysis of international law).
52 Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALRat 412-13.

53 The South African Constitutional Court evaluated the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Id. at 415-17, 418, 420, 421-23.

The South African court also examined the Canadian

Supreme Court's decision in Kindler v. Canada and distinguished it from Makwanyane on its
facts. Id. at 423-24 (noting that Kindler involved the validity of the executive's order of extradition, not the constitutionality of the death penalty in Canada). The South African court also examined the Indian Supreme Court's ruling in Bachan Singh, id. at 426-29, and a decision of the
Hungarian Constitutional Court, id. at 429-30.
54 The court reviewed rulings of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations and the
European Court of Human Rights. Id. at 425-26, 429. Examining Soering v. United Kingdom,
the South African court observed that the European Court of Human Rights had been in a "comparable position." Id. at 426. The South African court characterized Great Britain's dilemma in
Soering as a choice between extradition of a fugitive to the United States, which allows the death
penalty, and extradition to Germany, which had abolished capital punishment and which could
hold its citizens liable for acts committed elsewhere. Id. Similarly, the Makwanyane court explained (implicitly referencing Kindler) that it was choosing between capital punishment and life
imprisonment and that it did not face a "choice between freedom and death." Id.
55 Id. at 414.
56 The Canadian parliament eliminated the death penalty for domestic crimes in 1976, Kindler
v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 851 (Can.), so the Canadian Supreme Court did not have to decide
the constitutionality of capital punishment. The South African court noted that three justices in
Kindler nevertheless argued that the death penalty was inherently cruel and unusual. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 423, 432.
57 Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALRat 432.
58 Id. at 421, 428.
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Like its counterparts in Canada and India, the South African Constitutional Court was careful to ensure that an invalidation of the
death penalty would accord with domestic law.5 9 The South African
court noted that unlike the constitutions of the United States and India, and unlike the European Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), section 9 of the South Af'60
rican Interim Constitution guaranteed an "unqualified right to life."
The South African court interpreted such important rights broadly in
accord with "[t]he very reason for establishing the new legal order,"
which was to protect the rights of people who have limited control
over the political process. 61 Because the domestic situation did not require retention of the death penalty62 - and in fact pointed toward
abolition - the Constitutional Court adopted the dominant interna63
tional view and invalidated the death penalty.
3. The Absence of Legal Hierarchy. - The decisions discussed
above demonstrate that even as the international judicial dialogue has
increased in complexity and has begun to include participants from a
variety of countries, the interpretive process has remained much the

59 The South African court made it clear that supranational and foreign legal sources, even if
persuasive, could never be dispositive. See id. at 415 ("In dealing with comparative law we must
bear in mind that we are required to construe the South African Constitution, and not an international instrument or the constitution of some foreign country, and that this has to be done with
due regard to our legal system, our history and circumstances, and the structure and language of
our own Constitution.).
60 Id. at 429.
61 Id. at 431. For this reason, the court declared that prevailing public opinion on capital punishment could not be dispositive. See id. In the midst of its discussion of the U.S. Supreme
Court's capital punishment jurisprudence, the South African Constitutional Court acknowledged
some bitter truths about its legal system:
[T]he overwhelming majority of those sentenced to death are poor and black. There is
an enormous social and cultural divide between those sentenced to death and the Judges
before whom they appear, who are presently almost all white and middle class.... The
differences . .. are particularly relevant when the personal circumstances of the accused
have to be evaluated for the purposes of deciding upon the sentence.
Id. at 419 n.78. The court also noted that defense counsel was usually "young and inexperienced,
frequently of a different race to his or her client, and, if this is the case, usually has to consult
through an interpreter." Id. at 419. The court acknowledged that it was impossible to ensure
equality in the criminal justice system or to avoid all errors, but asserted that "death is different."
Id. at 421. While "[u]njust imprisonment is a great wrong... the killing of an innocent person is
irremediable." Id. These statements indicate the court's belief that the faults of the South African criminal justice system required the invalidation of capital punishment.
62 The Constitutional Court acknowledged the "high incidence of violent crime in South Africa," id. at 442, but concluded that the death penalty was not the proper method for dealing with
the problem, id. at 443. The court argued that the most important factor in deterring crime is the
likelihood that criminals will be apprehended and convicted, and observed that "[iut is that which
is presently lacking." Id. The court also found that life imprisonment would be a sufficient deterrent of crime. See id. at 445. The court accorded even "less weight" to the goal of retribution.
Id.
63 Id. at 451.
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same. If these courts believed that international law were superior to
domestic law, then they would only have to justify a decision not to
follow supranational and foreign law, and it would be easy to understand why none of them seems concerned about demonstrating that it
has a constitutional "license" to look to outside legal sources. But none
of these courts was willing to adopt an outside legal norm unless it accorded with domestic legal and political traditions. Thus, the interpretive process of these courts indicates that they do not view domestic
law as subordinate to international law.
The next section examines possible rationales for courts' decisions
to enter the international judicial dialogue. It argues that none of
these reasons adequately explains constitutional courts' lack of concern
about the existence of a constitutional "license" authorizing their use of
outside legal sources.
B. TheoreticalAspects of Incorporation
Constitutional courts that join the international conversation investigate supranational and foreign legal sources when faced with questions of constitutional interpretation. Scholars have identified various
practical and political reasons why courts might examine external legal
sources. The benefits that courts derive from the international judicial
dialogue may explain why domestic courts engage in the conversation
despite the inherent difficulties of incorporating legal norms from
abroad. These recognized benefits do not explain, however, why domestic courts are not troubled by another issue that arises in the constitutional context: whether the constitutional text "license[s]" a court's
reliance on outside legal norms.
By reexamining the cases discussed in section A, this section explores why the courts in those cases did not seem troubled by the issue
of constitutional license. Those courts seemed to assume that international and foreign legal sources should inform the meaning of their nations' constitutions. This section argues that many courts join the international judicial conversation with a particular conception of the
relationship between international law and their domestic constitutions. Those courts seem to view their domestic constitutions as part
of a family of foreign and supranational documents, each of which
serves as a source of general legal norms. Thus, the courts seem to
find it not only appropriate, but even natural, to examine (and perhaps
ultimately to rely on) the interpretations that their foreign and supranational counterparts have given to similar constitutional provisions.
.. Practicaland PoliticalReasons To Join the InternationalJudicial Dialogue. - Just as the framers of a new constitution find it use-
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ful to adopt ideas from foreign and supranational documents, 64 new
constitutional courts find it beneficial to "borrow '65 existing doctrine
from abroad. 66 The reliance of the Indian Supreme Court and the
scholarship and jurisSouth African Constitutional Court on foreign 67
prudence reflected in part this practical concern.
64 See L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2, at 18-i9 (noting the influence of the U.S. Constitution
on the Indian constitution and the influence of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on
other nations' constitutions). Eastern European nations drafting new constitutions looked primarily to Western European nations such as France or Germany. A.E. Dick Howard, Constitution-Making inCentral and Eastern Europe, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 5, 9 (i994); see also A.E.
Dick Howard, The Indeterminacy of Constitutions, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 383, 386-87
(x996) (noting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, inter alia, have heavily influenced
the newer constitutions in Eastern and Central Europe); Imre V6r6s, Contextuality and Universality: ConstitutionalBorrowings on the Global Stage - The Hungarian View, i U. PA. J. CONST. L.
651, 654 (1999) (noting that the framers of the Hungarian constitution looked to the U.S., German,
French, Spanish, and Italian constitutions and to the constitutional jurisprudence of their respective courts).
65 For uses of the term "borrowing" in the context of the international judicial dialogue, see
generally Kreimer, supra note 14;and V6r6s, supra note 64, at 655-59.
66 The courts of civil law nations, of course, do not cite other judicial rulings, whether from

foreign or domestic courts. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLIT-

ICAL ANALYSIS 135-36 (i98i); see also A.N. Yiannopoulos, Jurisprudence and Doctrine as
Sources of Law in Louisiana and in France, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND
DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS 69, 72 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974)

(explaining that jurisprudence, or case law, is not recognized in civil law nations as a source of
law because "the legislative function is entrusted to the legislature and the people exclusively"); cf.
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 36 (2d ed. 1985) (noting that civil
law nations have rejected the doctrine of stare decisis). This refusal to rely on precedent may
suggest that courts in civil law countries are unable to participate in the international judicial dialogue. Yet civil law nations do have an important role to play. For example, the German constitution ensures that the decisions of the German Constitutional Court are binding precedent. See
Donald P.Kommers, German Constitutionalism:A Prolegomenon, 4o EMORY L.J. 837, 840 (199i).
The German Constitutional Court has used this constitutional power to become an important
participant in the international judicial dialogue. See Slaughter, supra note i, at 1o7-o8. Civil
law courts in other parts of Europe may also participate because they must enforce the law of the
European Union. See Breyer, supra note 15, at 1059 (noting that French courts, which have not
traditionally had the power of judicial review, must invalidate domestic statutes that conflict with
European law).
In addition, some scholars in civil law countries such as France argue that although judges
do not cite cases, they do in practice rely on the reasoning of past judicial rulings. See
MERRYMAN, supra, at 47; Jean Carbonnier, Authorities in Civil Law: France, in THE ROLE OF
JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS, supra,
at 91, 97. Judges can usually determine, even absent citations, the prior opinions on which a decision relies. SHAPIRO, supra, at 135. Under this analysis, civil law courts can participate in the
international judicial dialogue to some extent. Because, however, one focus of this Part is the interpretive process of the international judicial conversation, it focuses on common law courts that

do cite precedent.

67 See Makwanyane, 1995 (3)SALR at 414 ("Comparative 'bill of rights' jurisprudence will no
doubt be of importance, particularly in the early stages of transition when there is no developed
indigenous jurisprudence in this branch of the law on which to draw."); Bachan Singh v. Punjab,
[19801 2 S.C.J. 475, 504 (India) (indicating that there had been few empirical studies on crime

within India's own borders and turning to international and foreign sources for that information).
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This process of borrowing results from more than just the need for
legal sources. Many countries have significant political reasons for incorporating outside legal norms. Some countries with unfortunate international reputations join the international judicial dialogue to improve their status in the world community. For example, South Africa,
which once permitted apartheid, has relied on the jurisprudence of its
Constitutional Court to help demonstrate the nation's renewed commitment to civil rights. 68 Other nations enter the international judicial
dialogue to increase their influence over the creation of international
norms. A desire for an authoritative role in the formation of international legal rules and standards seems to have motivated the participation of the Canadian Supreme Court 69 and some European constitutional courts.7 0
The South African Constitutional Court's decision in Makwanyane
illustrates that participating in the dialogue can help a national court
gain international influence. In discussing (and distinguishing) the Indian Supreme Court's jurisprudence on capital punishment, the South
African Constitutional Court compared its overview of international
jurisprudence to that of the Bachan Singh court. 71 The Makwanyane
court's analysis suggests that courts that engage in the international
judicial conversation help to define the predominant international judicial opinion on a particular legal question. This development has
significant implications for courts that decline to engage in the international dialogue. Although the ruling of any national court that deals
with a substantive legal issue (such as the propriety of extraditing a
fugitive to face the death penalty) may influence other courts that deal
with analogous legal questions, only courts that engage in the interna68 See Hoyt K. Webb, The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights Interpretation and
Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, i U. PA. J. CONST. L. 205, 232 (I998). Similarly, after World
War II the German Constitutional Court used its jurisprudence to overcome the stigma of the war
and to demonstrate Germany's concern for human rights to the international community. See
Ackerman, supra note 12, at 779-80. Also for political reasons, the nations of the former Soviet
bloc altered their domestic law to integrate with their Western European counterparts. See
Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1303 n.353; cf. Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Stefaan Van der Jeught, Human Rights Protection Under the New Constitutions of Central Europe, 20 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 475, 480 (1998) (noting that the constitutions of the Czech and Slovak Republics explicitly ban capital punishment and that one of the early decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court invalidated the death penalty); Ruti Teitel, Post-Communist Constitutionalism: A
Transitional Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. x67, 168-69 (1994) (arguing that the
jurisprudence of the newly formed constitutional courts helped realize the protections listed in the
texts of the constitutions of the former communist bloc).
69 L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2, at 37; see id. at 38 ("In my view, the most useful judgments
for courts looking to comparative sources are those that use comparative materials themselves .... Decisions which look only inward ... have less relevance . . . .
70 Slaughter, supra note i, at 1107-08 (describing the competition for influence between European supranational and national courts).
71 Makwanyane, 1995 (3)SALR at 427-29.
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tional judicial conversation can contribute to the definition of the prejudicial norm and shape the development of
dominant international
72
international law.

The Difficulties of Incorporation:A Possible Need for a Consti2.
tutional "License." - Section B.i suggests why national courts might
not be deterred from engaging in the international judicial dialogue by
some of the usual difficulties of comparative legal analysis - for example, problems created by differences in language, history, culture,
and tradition.7 3 The cases discussed in section A illustrate how courts
can overcome these difficulties by incorporating only those outside le74
gal standards that accord with domestic political and legal traditions.
The benefits of participating in the international judicial conversation
do not explain, however, why courts that engage in constitutional interpretation do not attempt to show that their constitutions explicitly
permit their reliance on outside legal sources.
Professor Mark Tushnet contends that a constitutional court may
need a textual "license" before it can engage in the international judicial dialogue. 71 In light of this argument, it is curious that none of the
courts discussed in section A felt compelled to demonstrate that it had

72 Cf. L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2, at 39 (arguing that "considering and comparing judgments from various jurisdictions makes for stronger, more considered decisions, even if the result
is the same"). For a discussion of the implications of this development for the U.S. Supreme
Court, see note x 7, below.
73 See MARY ANN GLENDON, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON & CHRISTOPHER OSAKWE,
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 4-5 (2d ed. 1994) ("Variations in the political, moral, social
and economic values which exist between any two societies make it hard to believe that many
legal problems are the same for both except on a technical level."); Kreimer, supra note 14, at 647
(noting problems of translation and arguing that even when nations use the same language, "verbal similarities may be misleading"); Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1265-69 (explaining that the existence of multiple variables in comparative constitutional analysis makes it difficult for nations to
learn from each other); cf. Wyman, supra note 14, at 56o, 564-65 (noting, though criticizing, the
argument that cultural differences with abolitionist nations justify the use of the death penalty in
China and in Islamic states).
74 Courts also avoid the problems of comparative law by looking to decisions of courts from
nations with similar constitutional texts and legal histories. See L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2, at
31-32 (noting the tendency of courts to rely on decisions that interpret similar textual provisions);
see also Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification:Toward a Theory of Comparative
ConstitutionalInterpretation,74 IND. L.J. 8x9, 87,-85 (i999) (arguing that because of the countries' shared historical and legal background, the Canadian Supreme Court could rely on the U.S.
Supreme Court's Native American jurisprudence when deciding aboriginal rights cases).
Professor Mary Ann Glendon argues persuasively that even when nations do not borrow
legal rules from other nations, they may learn important lessons about domestic culture. See
MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 8-9 (1987). For an
insightful discussion of some of the difficulties with this use of comparative law, see Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1269-81.

7s Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1231 ("We might say that the Constitution must license the use of
comparative material for the courts to be authorized to learn from constitutional experience elsewhere.").
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permission to engage in comparative analysis.7 6 Because the concern
about a textual license may be based on separation of powers theory,77
courts that do not have a strict view of their judicial roles would not
be expected to worry about the issue. Yet even courts that claim to
practice judicial restraint, such as the Canadian and Indian Supreme
Courts, 78 seem unconcerned whether their constitutions license their
examination of foreign and supranational legal sources. In the cases
discussed in section A, both of these courts assumed that international
law should inform their constitutional interpretation, without recognizing that there might be a need to justify that assumption.
3. An International View of the Domestic Constitution. - The
willingness of domestic constitutional courts to look to international
law without justifying that interpretive approach suggests that they
view their constitutions as components of a larger body of international legal documents. To the constitutional courts of Canada, Jamaica, India, and South Africa, their constitutions are not simply domestic charters that reflect the values of Canadian, Jamaican, Indian,
or South African society, but examples of many world documents that
76 The South African Constitutional Court did note that a provision in its constitution seemed
to require (and thus license) the examination of international and comparative law. Makwanyane,
1995 (3) SALR at 413; see supra pp. 2o56-57. Yet the court insisted that the provision was not
dispositive. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 413 ("The international and foreign authorities are of
value because they ... show how Courts of other jurisdictions have dealt with [the] vexed issue
[of the death sentence]. For that reason alone, they require our attention."). Other constitutions
also provide what is arguably a textual license for international and comparative analysis. See
Henckaerts & Van der Jeught, supra note 68, at 504 (observing that article 7 of the Hungarian
constitution states that domestic law must adopt international norms).
77 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, xxo HARV. L. REV. 8x5, 861 (1997) ("The federal
common law of foreign relations is based on the principle that the federal political branches, and
not the courts, are constitutionally authorized and institutionally competent to make foreign relations judgments.").
One of the concerns may be that the judiciary does not have a tremendous amount of guidance regarding how to apply international law, and thus may go beyond the proper judicial function.
Cf H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 214 (2d ed. 1994) ("[I]nternational
law... [lacks] a unifying rule of recognition specifying 'sources' of law and providing general
criteria for the identification of its rules."). The problem may also involve democratic theory: one
nation's courts should not rely on the decisions of judges whom that nation's citizens did not have
even an indirect voice in selecting. Cf Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 501, 504 (2000) ("The application of international law
is thus fraught with the anxiety of imperialism: how can international law be perceived as legitimate by a community that has not participated equally in its creation or does not see its own reality reflected in international law?").
78 While looking to foreign materials, the Indian Supreme Court emphasized its attitude of
judicial restraint and its usual reluctance to hold acts of parliament unconstitutional. See Bachan
Singh v. Punjab, [i98o] 2 S.CJ. 475, 493, 505 (India). The Canadian Supreme Court similarly
declared its commitment to judicial restraint in matters of foreign affairs. See Kindler v. Canada,
[x99x] 2 S.C.R. 779, 849 (Can.) ("In recognition of the various and complex considerations which
necessarily enter into the extradition process .... judicial scrutiny should not be over-exacting.").
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reflect general legal norms. Justice Kirby of the Australian Supreme
Court explains:
To the full extent that its text permits, Australia's Constitution ... accommodates itself to international law, including insofar as that
law expresses basic rights. The reason for this is that the Constitution not
only speaks to the people of Australia .... It also speaks to the internalaw of the Australian nation which is a
tional community as the basic
79
community.
that
of
member
Most of the world's constitutions were written, and most of its constitutional courts were created, within the context of the international
constitutional dialogue.8 0 The Indian constitution (i949), the Jamaican
constitution (1962), the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(1982), and the South African Interim Constitution (i993) were drafted
8
largely by looking to foreign and international experience. ' Similarly,
the constitutional courts, when interpreting the new constitutional
provisions, relied on foreign and international precedents. The constitutionalism of these countries developed around an international judicial (and nonjudicial) conversation. Thus, it seems that to be an Indian, Jamaican, Canadian, or South African believer in constitutionalism is to be a believer in international constitutionalism.
C. The American Anomaly
The U.S. Supreme Court has been notably absent from the international judicial dialogue. Even as its opinions are cited by constitutional courts all over the world,8 2 the U.S. Supreme Court continues to
look inward. Recently, Justice Stephen Breyer's judicial opinions have
83
advocated the use of comparative and international legal sources, but
other Justices have endorsed the international judicial dialogue only in

79 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd. v. Australia, (1997) 147 A.L.R. 42, 148 (Austl.).
80 See generally Ackerman, supra note 12 (describing the rise in the number of countries with
written constitutions and constitutional courts).
81 See L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2, at 18-19 (explaining the reliance of the framers of the
Indian constitution and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on international and foreign sources); see also Pratt v. Attorney-General for Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 18-19 (P.C. 1993)
(appeal taken from Jam.) (noting the influence of British tradition on Jamaican law after independence); cf. Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1237 (noting the tendency to look to foreign experience
when drafting a national constitution).
82 See, e.g., supra section A.2, pp. 2o55-58 (noting the reliance of the Indian Supreme Court
and the South African Constitutional Court on decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court). The decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts, and particularly decisions like Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (I954), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), "have had a large impact
on the spirit and development of human rights protections worldwide." L'Heureux-Dub6, supra
note 2, at 2o. The Rehnquist Court has made less of an international impact. Id. at 30.
83 See Breyer, supra note 15, at io6o; see also Fried, supra note 14, at 818 (noting the significance of the fact that Justice Breyer has brought the debate over the propriety of using outside
legal materials from law review articles into the Court's official opinions).
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unofficial contexts.8 4 This section suggests that the Court's reluctance
to rely on the precedents of foreign and supranational tribunals stems
from its belief in the purely American character of the U.S. Constitution.
i. One Justice's Attempt To Join the InternationalJudicial Dialogue. - The U.S. Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence illustrates some willingness to examine the practices of the international
community.85 In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 6 the Court identified the
reason that it has looked to international opinion in capital cases: 87
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual" punishment is informed by the "evolving standards of decency that mark the

84 Several Justices have expressed interest in the international judicial dialogue. See Slaughter, supra note i, at 1118-i9; see also Breyer, supra note i5,at 1045 n.i (describing his recent trip
to Europe to meet with judges of various constitutional courts, and noting that Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Ginsburg accompanied him). In a 1989 speech, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
[N]ow that constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the
United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in
their own deliberative process. The United States courts, and legal scholarship in our
country generally, have been somewhat laggard in relying on comparative law and decisions of other countries. But I predict that with so many thriving constitutional courts
in the world today... that approach will be changed in the near future.
William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts - Comparative Remarks, in GERMANY AND ITS
BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE - A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412
(Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
The Chief Justice has taken a few steps toward engaging the international judicial dialogue
(thus far, outside the context of capital punishment). See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 81i, 828 (1097)
(Rehnquist, C.J.) ("There would be nothing irrational about a system that granted standing [to
legislators]; some European constitutional courts operate under one or another variant of such a
regime.... But it is obviously not the regime that has obtained under our Constitution to date.");
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing
without discussion the West German Constitutional Court's decision declaring unconstitutional a
law that permitted abortion and a Canadian court's decision invalidating a restriction on abortion).
85 In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (977), when analyzing the validity of capital punishment
in rape cases, the Court stated that it was "not irrelevant" that much of the rest of the world had
abolished the death penalty in such cases. Id. at 596 n.lo. A few years later in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), which involved the imposition of the death penalty for felony murder,
the Court reiterated the view that "international opinion" might be relevant to the determination
of the Eighth Amendment's meaning. Id. at 796 n.22; see Wyman, supra note 14, at 554 (arguing
that the Enmund Court "explicitly adopted consideration of international opinion as part of its
'disproportionality analysis' concerning capital punishment").
86 487 U.S. 815 (z988).
87 In Thompson, in which the Court declared the death penalty an inappropriate punishment
for juveniles below the age of sixteen, id. at 838, the plurality conducted a survey, more elaborate
than in previous decisions, of international opinion. The Court noted that many countries, including West Germany, France, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries, had abolished the death penalty. Id. at 831. Other nations, such as Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland,
had significantly limited the use of capital punishment. Id. Even nations retaining the death
penalty, including Great Britain, New Zealand, and the Soviet Union, had prohibited the death
penalty in cases involving juveniles. Id. at 83o-3 1.
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progress of a maturing society."88 The practices of foreign countries,
particularly Western European democracies, were relevant to the determination of those evolving standards.8 9
As Justice Breyer has recently suggested in a case involving the
"death row phenomenon," the same rationale could support a reliance
on foreign and supranational jurisprudence. In Knight v. Florida,90
the Court refused to hear a petitioner's claim that his twenty-five-year
detention on death row constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 9 Justice Breyer, dissenting from
the Court's denial of certiorari, conducted a survey of foreign and supranational jurisprudence that in many ways mirrored the interpretive
process of the Indian, Jamaican, Canadian, and South African
courts. 92 Justice Breyer argued that the U.S. Supreme Court should
consider the decisions of the British Privy Council in Pratt v. AttorneyGeneralfor Jamaica and the European Court of Human Rights in So-

ering v. United Kingdom, both of which supported the petitioners'
claims that their detentions were cruel and unusual. 93 Although Justice Breyer acknowledged that the Canadian Supreme Court had
in Kindler v. Canada, he distinguished
reached a contrary conclusion
94
that decision on its facts.
Justice Breyer, like his foreign judicial counterparts, was careful to

demonstrate that granting the defendant's petition on the merits would
accord with American traditions. He stressed that his opinion relied
primarily on rulings from jurisdictions with similar legal back-

88 Id. at 821 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 1o (1958)). In Trop v. Dulles, the Court
barred the use of denationalization to punish a serviceman who had deserted his company during
World War II. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102. In discussing its "evolving standards" analysis, the Court
indicated that international opinion and practice were relevant to determining those evolving
standards. Id. at io; see id. at 102-03 ("The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime. .... [A] United Nations' survey.., reveals that only two countries, the Philippines and Turkey, impose denationalization as a
penalty for desertion.").
89 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31.
90 528 U.S. 990 (1999).

91 Id. at 994 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting the length of detention).
In a companion case to Knight, the defendant protested a delay of nineteen years. Id. at 993.
92 See id. at 995-96.
93 Id. Justice Breyer also referred to similar limitations that the Indian and Zimbabwean Supreme Courts put on the length of death row detention. Id. The year before, in another case involving the death row phenomenon, Justice Breyer had similarly referred to the European Court
of Human Rights's decision in Soering as well as another decision of the British Privy Council.
See Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998).
94 Knight, 528 U.S. at 996 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Breyer observed that the delays involved in Knight and its companion case were much longer than the delay in Kindler. Id. Noting that the Canadian Supreme Court was divided 4-3 in Kindler, Justice
Breyer wondered if the court would have reached the same substantive conclusion if faced with a
case involving delays of nineteen and twenty-five years. Id.
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grounds. 9 5 Justice Breyer pointed out that judges of the courts to
which he referred, like a majority of the members of the U.S. Supreme
9 6 He
Court, "accept or assume the lawfulness of the death penalty."
also drew support from legal systems that, like that of the United
States, are rooted in the common law tradition of the United Kingdom. 97
Justice Breyer stressed that he did not consider foreign or supranational jurisprudence to be binding.98 His analysis indicates, however,
that he viewed such materials as helpful tools for the interpretation of
the U.S. Constitution. The next section examines why other Justices
do not seem to share Justice Breyer's enthusiasm for the international
judicial conversation.
2. The Court's Reluctance To Join the InternationalJudicial Dialogue. - Stanford v. Kentucky, 99 which involved the constitutionality
of imposing the death penalty on juveniles, may shed light on the
Court's reluctance to analyze foreign and supranational jurisprudence.
In an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, an ardent opponent of the use
of outside jurisprudence, 0 0 the Court, while acknowledging the
"evolving standards" analysis in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 10 ' declared that "it is American conceptions of decency that are
dispositive."10

2

Justice Scalia explained:

While "[t]he practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can
be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people
is not merely a historical accident, but rather so 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty' that it occupies a place not merely in our mores, but, text

permitting, in our Constitution as well," they cannot serve to establish the
first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among
our people. 103

9s Id. at 997-98.
96 Id. at 995.
97 See id. at 997. Citing Thompson, Enmund, Coker, and Pop, Justice Breyer noted that the
U.S. Supreme Court had previously "found particularly instructive opinions of former Commonwealth nations insofar as those opinions reflect a legal tradition that also underlies our own
Eighth Amendment." Id. Justice Breyer also emphasized that holding long detentions unconstitutional would not conflict with various treaty provisions inserted at the behest of the U.S. Senate
to exempt the United States from certain limitations on capital punishment. Id. at 996-97.
98 Id. at 996 (emphasizing that "we are interpreting a 'Constitution for the United States of
America'" (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 8,5, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
99 492 U.S. 361 (1989).

loo See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 649; Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1281.
101 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369.
102 Id. at 369 n.i. The dissent strongly disputed this claim. Id. at 389 (Brennan, J., dissenting)

("Our cases recognize that objective indicators of contemporary standards of decency in the form
of legislation in other countries is [sic] also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis.").
103 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.a (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (i937))) (internal citations omitted).
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Justice Scalia seems to be saying that before the Court may even
mention the practices of other nations, it must satisfy the "prerequisite"
of showing that a similar American practice exists. He appears to believe that before looking abroad the Court must establish that American experience already mandates its decision, thereby demonstrating
or supranational practice is unnecessary to a
that comment on foreign
s0 4
holding of the Court.
The Court's previous capital punishment cases support the claim
that the Court must first establish a basis for its decisions in American
practice and precedent. 05 In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court again
stated that the proper mode of analysis in Eighth Amendment cases is
to look first to the opinions of state legislatures and then to the practices of sentencing juries, both of which are important "indicators of
contemporary standards of decency."'10

6

Although the Thompson Court

later noted the relevance of international opinion, 10 7 it did so only after
conducting a long and detailed survey of American opposition to the
execution of those below the age of sixteen.10 8 According to the majority in Stanford, Justice Scalia's "prerequisite" could not be satisfied because there was no American consensus on the execution of sixteen104 Because Justice Scalia states in Stanford that the practices of other democracies may sometimes be "relevant," he seems to acknowledge the usefulness of comparative analysis in constitutional interpretation. But his recent statements in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997),
which involved the constitutionality of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, suggest otherwise. In Printz, the Court invalidated, as an intrusion on state sovereignty, provisions of the
Brady Act that state and local law enforcement officers were required to carry out. See id. at 935.
Justice Scalia, responding to the argument in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion that European
practice might support the constitutionality of the Act, stated unequivocally: "We think such
comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of
course quite relevant to the task of writing one." Id. at 921 n.i i. The quotation from Printz suggests that Justice Scalia no longer agrees with his own claim that foreign practice may occasionally be "relevant." Perhaps his statements in Stanford are best understood as an attempt to reconcile his opinion with, while at the same time giving a limiting construction to, the Court's
discussion of foreign practice in Coker, Enmund, and Thompson. Cf i LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-16, at 83 (3 d ed. 2000) (arguing, and noting Justice
Scalia's agreement, that "the principle of stare decisis must with some frequency require a judge
to follow ...constitutional precedents that the same judge would overrule if ...unconstrained by
the pull of previously decided cases").
105 In Coker v. Georgia, the Court, before noting international practice, surveyed the practice of
various states and found a broad American consensus that the death penalty was an inappropriate punishment for rape. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-97 (977). The Court noted that
although many states attempted to reinstate capital punishment after the Court invalidated the
death penalty in Furmanv. Georgia, few had done so in the case of rape. Id. at 594. In Enmund
v. Florida, the Court similarly examined American practice before commenting on international
opinion. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794-96 (1982) (surveying the tendency of American
juries not to impose the death penalty on defendants who were not directly responsible for the
taking of life).
106 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988).

107 Id. at 830-31.

108 See id. at

823-29.
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Thus, any international viewpoint was ir-

0

Perhaps Justice Scalia's reasoning in Stanford could be understood
as an attempt to avoid the substance of international legal opinion,
which almost universally opposes the imposition of the death penalty
on minors.1 1 Yet such an interpretation would be overly simplistic.
As the analysis in section A indicates, the majority in Stanford could
have arrived at its result without avoiding foreign and supranational
jurisprudence. The Court could have surveyed international views on
the juvenile death penalty but then explained that domestic conditions
(specifically, the fact that many states continue to impose the death
penalty on minors) were such that it could not follow the international
112
trend.
Perhaps the Stanford Court's insistence on first establishing an
American tradition is better understood in relation to the Court's view
of the U.S. Constitution. As section B shows, the drafters of many
constitutions relied on supranational and foreign legal sources during
the drafting process. 113 Similarly, newly formed constitutional courts,
when interpreting their constitutional texts, have taken advantage of
the existing precedents of supranational courts and foreign courts such
as the U.S. Supreme Court.1 14 The constitutional traditions of these
nations, therefore, seem to have developed around an international judicial (and nonjudicial) dialogue.
The constitutional history of the United States is quite different.
For over two hundred years, the nation has developed and nurtured a
109 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). Justice Scalia observed that of the
thirty-seven states that then authorized capital punishment, twenty-two states imposed it on sixteen-year-olds. Id. at 370. Justice Scalia concluded that the apparent reluctance of juries to impose the death penalty on young people did not constitute a sufficient basis to invalidate numerous state laws. Id. at 373-74.
110 Justice Thomas, concurring in the denial of certiorari in Knight, used a similar rationale for
rejecting international opinion. He commented that "were there any ...support [for the petitioners' claim] in our own jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary for proponents of the claim to rely
on the European Court of Human Rights ... or the Privy Council." Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S.
99o, 990 (I999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
111 See Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Fiore, The Supreme Court of the United States Has Been
Called upon To Determine the Legality of the Juvenile Death Penalty in Michael Domingues v.
State of Nevada, 2 1 WHITTIER L. REV. 215, 2,5-16 (1999) (noting that only six countries, including the United States, have imposed the death penalty on minors since 199o).
112 The Court could have used reasoning analogous to that of the Indian Supreme Court in
Bachan Singh, which relied on the text of the Indian constitution and on the apparent views of its
framers to explain the inapplicability of outside precedent. See supra p. 2056. The cases discussed in section A, pp. 2052-59, above, demonstrate that it is possible to recognize an international legal view without adopting it.
113 See sources cited supra note 64.
114 See L'Heureux-DuW, supra note 2, at 20 (noting that because the only law reports available
in the early days of the international judicial dialogue were those of British and American courts,
young constitutional courts were in large part limited to the precedents of those jurisdictions).
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Perhaps that is one reason that
domestic constitutional tradition.11
the U.S. Supreme Court resists the international judicial dialogue. To
cite foreign jurisdictions, to examine and distinguish their cases as
precedents, is to admit that the U.S. Constitution is but one (even if an
important one) of many instruments that define general legal norms.
As the Australian justice quoted in section B indicated, 116 to join the
international dialogue is to concede that the rest of the world's constitutions and other international documents "speak to," and thereby help
determine the content of, domestic constitutions.' 17
Perhaps the above analysis helps to explain why Justice Scalia emphasized the order of the Court's analysis. If the Court were first to
establish the basis for a decision by examining American practices,
then any reference to foreign or supranational rulings would merely
reaffirm the propriety of American legal norms. Yet if the Court were
first to examine foreign or supranational decisions, even if it were to
115 See generally MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1994) (cataloguing the cultural and popular aspects

of American constitutionalism). Kammen observes that in the mid-nineteenth century, Daniel
Webster remarked that the U.S. Constitution "is all that gives us a NATIONAL character." Id. at
94 (internal citations omitted). In ig8x, Senator Lowell P. Weicker of Connecticut similarly remarked: "[Constitutionalism is] what holds us all together." Id. at 398; cf. Kreimer, supra note 14,
at 648 ("A constitution may 'constitute' the commitments that define a national identity....
[T]hese commitments can embody the civil religion of the nation.').
116 See supra p. 2064.

117 Professor Vicki Jackson identifies other potential reasons for the Court's resistance to joining the international judicial conversation. Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism:Opening up the Conversationon "Proportionality,"Rights and Federalism, x U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 592-99 (1999) (observing that American courts' resistance may
be related to the inadequate teaching of foreign law in American law schools and the current Supreme Court's focus on interpreting the Constitution in accord with the views of the American
Framers). The Court's reticence may also stem from the fact that some of the reasons that other
courts join the international judicial dialogue do not apply to the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, a court may fear that abstaining from the international judicial conversation will decrease
its international influence. This concern does not yet apply to the U.S. Supreme Court, however,
as many foreign constitutional courts cite the Court's rulings despite its unwillingness to join the
dialogue. But see L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2, at 30, 37-38 (noting that foreign courts cite decisions of the Rehnquist Court less often than they do those of its predecessors, the Warren and
Burger Courts, and speculating that this decline in influence may be related to the Rehnquist
Court's failure to engage in the international dialogue).
Yet even if other constitutional courts continue to examine the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence, the Court's isolationism is likely to limit its international influence. As section B discusses, the South African Constitutional Court in Makwanyane looked to the Indian Supreme
Court's decision in Bachan Singh, not only for its substantive analysis of the death penalty, but
also for its examination of international opinion. See supra pp. 2o61-62. The South African
court's focus on the Indian court's examination of outside legal norms suggests that courts may be
developing legal rules for identifying predominant international judicial norms. To the extent that
the U.S. Supreme Court chooses not to engage in international and comparative analysis, it will
be unable to influence the debate over what constitutes the international norm in a particular area
of law. If the U.S. Supreme Court later decides to join the international dialogue, it may face the
prospect of incorporating substantive international norms that it did not help to create.
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distinguish them by pointing to a conflicting American practice, the
act of analyzing outside precedents would itself indicate that taking
account of the views of the international community is appropriate to
the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. Under this view, by taking
part in the international judicial conversation, the Justices would strip
the U.S. Constitution of its purely American character.
D. Conclusion
Over the last twenty years, the international judicial dialogue has
evolved from a simple conversation (in which courts relied primarily
on the published reports of the United States and Britain) to a complex
dialogue involving citations to courts throughout the world. Joining
this increasingly sophisticated dialogue provides a constitutional court
with an opportunity to influence the development of international law.
Conversely, as Canadian Supreme Court Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 has
argued, not joining the dialogue may limit a court's capacity to shape
international debate.1 18
The Canadian Supreme Court's recent ruling in United States v.
Burns,119 which involved the extradition of two fugitives to face possible capital sentences in the United States, 120 supports Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6's claim. In Burns, the Canadian Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Kindler v. Canada that the Canadian constitution does, in some cases, permit the extradition of fugitives to face the
death penalty. 2 ' However, the court's survey of the abolitionist tendencies in international and domestic opinion in the years since Kindler convinced it that current constitutional principles required that the
Canadian government meet a higher burden - perhaps by demonstrating necessity - to justify the extradition of a fugitive without requesting assurances from the recipient nation that it would not seek
the death penalty. 2 2 Citing in particular the British Privy Council's
decision in Pratt v. Attorney-Generalfor Jamaicaand Justice Breyer's
118 L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2, at 37; see supra note 69.
119 2001 SCC 7 (Can.), http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/rec/html/burnsi.en.html

(lat

visited Apr. 18, 2001).
120 The United States sought the extradition of two fugitives for two murders committed in the
11-13.
state of Washington. Id.
121 Id. 67 ("[W]e affirm that the 'balancing process' set out in Kindler ... is the correct approach ... ."). The court was careful to stress that Kindler does not "provide[] a blanket approval
to extraditions to face the death penalty." Id. 64.
122 Id.
131. Notably, the court observed that the U.N. Security Council had chosen to ex-

clude the death penalty from the possible punishments of the ICTY and the ICTR "despite the
heinous nature of the crimes alleged against the accused individuals." Id. 88; see also supra
note 7 (noting the potential for the new international criminal tribunals to increase the complexity
and sophistication of the international judicial dialogue). The court found that domestic opinion
in Canada had, since Kindler, turned decidedly against the death penalty Burns, 200, SCC 7,
85, 96-104.
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dissenting opinion in Knight v. Florida,the court found that the international view of the "death row phenomenon" accompanying capital
cases counseled against extradition without
assurances in cases that
123
were likely to involve a long detention.
The Canadian court's citation in Burns to Justice Breyer's dissent,
rather than to any other recent U.S. state or federal court decision regarding the death row phenomenon, 124 suggests that Justice Breyer's
willingness to look to outside jurisprudence renders his opinions more
influential in foreign and supranational jurisdictions. Conversely, the
U.S. Supreme Court's failure to engage in the international judicial
dialogue may cause other nations to be less willing to rely on its rulings.
The cases discussed in this Part illustrate how the dialogue
among domestic and supranational courts has contributed to the formation of legal norms for death penalty cases, and it seems likely that
the international judicial conversation will similarly influence the development of other international norms. Cases such as Burns raise the
question whether the U.S. Supreme Court's reluctance to engage in
dialogue with its foreign counterparts will reduce its ability to shape
the conversation about legal norms.
Many constitutional courts have been eager to engage in the international judicial dialogue and to take advantage of the opportunity to
influence the development of international law, but the U.S. Supreme
Court has remained reticent. If taking part in the dialogue allows a
court to influence the development of international law, it may seem
surprising that the U.S. Supreme Court would be so reluctant to join
the conversation. But perhaps the willingness (or unwillingness) of
constitutional courts to look to foreign or supranational jurisprudence
is explained in part by the way that particular courts view their domestic constitutions. The U.S. Supreme Court seems to regard the
123 Burns, 2001 SCC 7, 1

120-122.

The Canadian Supreme Court cited Justice Breyer's dis-

sent in Elledge v. Florida. Id. 122. The Canadian court also cited the South African Constitutional Court's decision in Makwanyane to support its assertion that the "balancing process" in
Kindler did not include a consideration of public opinion. Id. 67.
124 See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990-9i (I999) (citing federal and state court rulings
that rejected appeals based on the death row phenomenon); see also Recent Case, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 648 (2000) (discussing an Illinois Supreme Court decision holding that the death row phenomenon is not cruel and unusual). The South African Constitutional Court's decision in Makwanyane as well as the Indian Supreme Court's ruling in Bachan Singh suggest that it is not unusual for foreign courts to cite American state supreme court decisions.
See State v.
Makwanyane, 1995 (3)SALR 391, 421 n.82 (CC) (S. Afr.) (citing a decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts); id. at 46 n.62 (citing a decision of the California Supreme Court);
id. at 421 n.84 (citing a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit); Bachan Singh
v. Punjab, [1980] 2 S.C.J. 475, 518-20 (India) (mentioning decisions of the Florida and Georgia
state supreme courts); see also supra note 32 (observing that the British Privy Council cited a decision of the Ninth Circuit). The only other citation in Burns to American jurisprudence was a
reference to a dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (95o).
Burns, 2001 SCC 7,1 122.
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U.S. Constitution as a document with a uniquely American character,
and thus, a document that should not be informed by outside jurisprudence. Courts that have joined the international judicial dialogue, by
contrast, seem to perceive their constitutions as documents that "speak
to," and listen to, the entire international community.

